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Management as the sine qua non for M&A success 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Measuring management practices robustly is difficult, which leaves an important element missing 
in identifying M&A success. This paper studies management practices as an unobserved (latent) 
variable using a standard microeconomic model. We show that our measure is the most important 
determinant of value creation in M&A deals: a one-standard-deviation increase in the measure 
almost doubles cumulative abnormal returns. Our results are robust to the inclusion of acquirer 
fixed effects, to a large set of control variables, and to several other sensitivity tests. We posit that 
any future study of M&A success should include a management component. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the voluminous literature on merger and acquisition (M&A) success, the main source of 
that success remains an issue of debate. Most of the variables that researchers propose as 
determinants of acquirers’ performance add little explanatory power to models of value creation. 
The main reason is that M&A success relies on variables that, by their own nature, relate to the 
acquirer’s management practices (Golubov et al., 2015), which are either entirely unobserved to 
researchers or difficult to measure. In this study, we examine management practices among the 
executive and top management teams of acquirers (entrepreneurship, skill, ability, etc.). We show 
that broadly defined and measured management practices are the most important determinant (the 
sine qua non) of takeover success. 
 The broad definition of “management practices” includes all business decisions and 
leadership elements. According to mainstream management theory (Katz, 1974), there are three 
components of management: human resource management (the ability to interact, communicate, 
motivate, and negotiate), technical abilities (human capital, knowledge, and proficiency), and 
conceptual skills (understanding concepts, develop ideas, and implement strategies).1 The recent 
M&A literature does not account for these three components sufficiently: the role of management 
is either loosely measured by executive compensation, CEO experience, or other board 
characteristics (e.g., McDonald et al., 2008; Custodio et al., 2013; Jaffe et al., 2013) — or it is 
simply unaccounted for, thus constituting an important omitted variable.  
In our research, we use the implications of recent production economics literature, which 
suggest that management practices are indispensable in defining production relations. Specifically, 
                                                 
1 We primarily use the term “management practices,” as this is the most general term encompassing human resource 
management, technical abilities, and conceptual skills. Economics textbooks often call the concept entrepreneurship, 
and some management textbooks describe it as average skill or ability of executives and managers.   
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following standard economic theory, Delis and Tsionas (2017) use a production model assuming 
that besides labor and capital (capital includes land) firms employ a third factor of production to 
achieve their objectives. This assumption is perfectly aligned with the idea that there are three 
inputs of production and that management (or entrepreneurship) complements capital and labor 
(e.g., Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009). Management practices are, however, unobserved (latent) 
and can be approximated by priors in Bayesian techniques. This model yields estimates of 
management practices that are highly correlated (by more than 90%) with the state-of-the-art index 
of management practices in the World Management Survey (WMS) in Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007; 2010). Specifically, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show that firms optimally choose their 
executives and managers to utilize their talents, skills, and overall competences to improve 
productivity and value. Thus, this measurement is fully in line with the broad definition of 
management, including human resources, technical, and conceptual skills.   
 Of course, firms also choose executives and managers for their skills in identifying 
potentially successful M&A deals, as well as improving the combined firm that emerges after 
M&A. Thus, the full set of management practices, as broadly defined, plays a role in M&A 
success. In turn, we use our management practices index to explain cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). Our baseline specification follows from the extant literature on CAR modeling around 
M&As (e.g., Bao and Edmans, 2011; Golubov et al., 2015), with the exception that we add our 
management index. Our results are striking, showing that our index is economically the most 
significant explanatory variable of CARs. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in that 
measure raises CAR by more than 100% for M&A deals with mean CAR. Also, incorporating 
management practices more than doubles the model’s adjusted R-squared (from 4.3% in the model 
without management to 9.1% in the model with management). 
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 Importantly, our results are quite similar when including acquirer fixed effects in our 
general sample or in samples of repeated (frequent or occasional) acquirers. This suggests that 
management practices or skill are time-variant: that is, the dynamics of employment (entry and 
exit of employees) and the learning process are important in defining M&A success.   
 These results survive across a large battery of sensitivity tests. Specifically, we first use a 
long list of explanatory variables that the literature shows significantly explain CARs, including 
governance indicators, characteristics of top executives, and firm performance indicators. Second, 
we control for industry characteristics (e.g., high-tech firms, R&D expenses, etc.) for the acquirer, 
the target, or both. Third, we use alternative time windows to construct CARs and remove outliers 
by winsorizing our data. In all these specifications, management is the most important determinant 
of CARs, second only to acquirer’s size in the specifications with fixed effects. 
 There are three interrelated contributions of our paper. First and foremost, we show that 
management, when properly measured, is among the most important (if not the most important) 
determinants of M&A success, essentially doubling the power of CAR models. This is the first 
paper that directly and empirically quantifies that good management and skill are so important in 
M&A success, ceteris paribus (i.e., irrespective of deal type and/or the characteristics of the 
acquirers and targets). Previous literature, especially Golubov et al. (2015), alludes to the idea 
because of the very low power of CAR models and the importance of acquirer fixed effects.  
Second, we introduce to the corporate finance literature a thorough measure of 
management that originates in standard microeconomic and management theories. This is 
important because governance characteristics cannot directly and fully capture management 
practices such as experience and previous M&A success. Further, our measure reflects the 
importance of within-firm variations in management practices, as the effect on M&A success 
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comes over and above acquirer fixed effects. Indeed, the recent literature examines how skill or 
acquirer fixed effects influence the returns on previous deals and the presence of the same CEO 
(Jaffe et al., 2013; Golubov et al., 2015). Despite the importance of these papers for the 
advancement of our understanding of determinants of M&A success, our study pinpoints and 
quantifies the exact role of management using a precise but general measure of acquirers’ 
management practices. In this respect, our study shows the importance of the time variation of 
management practices in explaining M&A success. 
Third, we bring together three well-established but distinct strands of literature in corporate 
finance, management science, and production economics. The relevant corporate finance literature 
examines the driving forces behind M&A success and explains a limited part of the variability in 
abnormal returns (e.g., Moeler et al., 2004; Masulis et al., 2007; Hartford et al., 2012; Golubov et 
al., 2015). The relevant management literature brings in the theoretical ideas of dynamic manager 
capabilities (e.g., Kor and Mesko) and overall effects on performance (e.g., Huselid, 1995). Last 
but not least, the relevant production economics literature highlights important aspects of 
empirically estimating production functions (e.g., Greene, 2008; Ackerberg et al., 2006). The 
merger of these three literatures allows us to explain a significant part of M&A success and opens 
up new pathways for exploring important aspects of financial management.           
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines management practices, briefly 
discusses existing measures, and provides the model and estimation for our measure. Section 3 
discusses the sample of M&As and estimation of CARs. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis 
of management practices in the CAR model. Section 5 concludes and provides directions for future 
research.   
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2. Management practices: Definition, theory, and measurement 
2.1. A broad definition of management practices 
Management’s role in value creation, governance, board structure, and CEO compensation is a 
vivid avenue for academic research in economics, finance, and management sciences (e.g., Harris 
and Holmstrom, 1982; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Silva, 2010). Here we define management 
practices in the broadest way possible. Our definition includes three main interrelated dimensions 
that originate in Katz (1974) and have become benchmarks in management literature.  
The first relates to human resource management, which encapsulates the abilities to lead, 
interact, communicate, motivate, and negotiate. These abilities are fundamental for managing 
employees of acquirers and targets, motivating them, providing a new vision after an acquisition, 
and successfully negotiating M&A deals at the highest level of detail. Technical abilities relate to 
human capital, depth of knowledge, and proficiency among CEOs, top executives, and managers. 
Technical skill implies, inter alia, proficiency in all aspects of firm value creation, including M&A 
deals or choices regarding those aiding in completing these deals. Third, conceptual skills include 
understanding concepts, developing new ideas, and implementing strategies. This involves seeing 
the enterprise as a whole, improving efficiency (the optimal use of inputs), and understanding a 
firm’s relationship with industry, political, social, and economic forces.   
Managers, top executives, and CEOs differ markedly in these practices within firms and 
across time. There are two main reasons for this. First, management is a learning-by-doing process, 
and good management implies fast learning and adaptation to emerging challenges in quickly 
changing environments. Second, decision-making teams evolve frequently; new members join the 
team and others leave. Accordingly, this shapes the skills across the three main dimensions of 
management.      
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2.2. Previous measures of management 
In M&As, where the allocation of resources is considerable and the risk of heavy losses is high 
(Hartford and Li, 2007; Moeller et al., 2005), we expect management practices to play a crucial 
role in creating value for acquirers. However, the literature considers only how distinct elements 
of management affect M&A success.  
Most closely related to our research objectives, for example, is the work on CEO 
experience in M&A deals. Jaffe et al. (2013) and document that CEOs who were successful in 
their last deals tend to have higher-performing subsequent acquisitions. Custodio and Metzger 
(2013) and McDonald et al. (2008) find that CEOs who have experience in M&As for specific 
industries are more likely to increase corporate value. This expertise could provide management 
teams with better information and superior bargaining power, all of which we expect to have 
positive effects for acquiring firms. Hayward (2002) provides similar results from the whole firms’ 
(as opposed to CEO) perspective. However, CEO experience and other corporate governance 
characteristics do not capture all good management practices. 
Several strands of literature attempt to proxy for management practices via firm size, 
performance indicators, and firm fixed effects. However, performance indicators tend to assume 
everything is the result of managerial skill; clearly this is not the case, because numerous firm 
characteristics and operational processes are outside the managers’ reach. Similarly, fixed effects 
tend to assume all time-invariant firm characteristics are management-related, which again is not 
the case because, inter alia, management practices are not stable over time.  
Most recent techniques use frontier-efficiency methods (e.g., data envelopment analysis, 
or DEA) and assume that skill is defined as efficiency if one subtracts variables outside the reach 
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of executives and managers, such as firm size and age, market share, ownership status, etc. (e.g., 
Demerjian et al., 2012). Delis and Tsionas (2017) suggest that there are two problems with this 
approach. The first is that, especially when using DEA, regressing efficiency scores on covariates 
results in econometric bias and inconsistency (Simar and Wilson, 2007). The second problem is 
that the variables used in the second stage never completely capture all firm elements that are 
beyond managerial control (much like performance indicators). This naturally creates omitted-
variable bias in the residuals, which then include other elements of efficiency besides those that 
managers control.   
The state-of-the-art way to measure management practices is suggested by Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007; 2010) and later studies by the same team. They use survey data (the World 
Management Survey, or WMS) for a limited number of firms worldwide to quantify best 
management practices that cover a full spectrum of managerial processes and explain how those 
processes affect productivity. In doing so, they report data on the usual firm inputs (capital and 
labor) and output (sales), along with a robust measure of managerial processes (what they call 
"management practices"). This approach is state-of-the-art because of the survey detail and the 
thorough illustration of different managerial operations and processes. 
Delis and Tsionas (2017) use the reported inputs and output from Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2017) to estimate a cost function that includes an unobserved (latent) input of production. They 
show that this latent input approximates the management practices measure in Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2017) by more than 90%. This is how we also measure management practices.   
 
2.3. A measure of management accommodating the broad definition 
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We estimate management practices at the firm-year level, building on the method in Delis and 
Tsionas (2017). According to that method, management practices constitute an unobserved (latent) 
input of production, along with labor and capital. This implies that the only unobserved input is 
management practices. There are two main reasons for this assumption, one theoretical and another 
based on empirical results. 
First, this assumption completely aligns with standard microeconomic theory, which 
assumes that there is a fourth factor of production besides land, labor, and capital. All modern 
economic textbooks list human capital, entrepreneurship, or a similar notion as that fourth factor 
(e.g., Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009), and this completes the list. Also, the fields of corporate 
governance and management science largely evolve around the idea that coordinating inputs 
requires human resource management, technical, and conceptual skills in order to gather, allocate, 
and distribute economic resources or consumer products to individuals and other businesses. 
However, “best management practices” are often missing from the list of inputs in the estimation 
of production relations. 
Second, Delis and Tsionas (2017) back our assumption. This study reports that, when 
estimated as a latent input of production, the index of management practices very closely 
approximates (by more than 90%) the state-of-the-art measure in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). 
This is the case when using the true (but small) sample of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and 
when using an extensive Monte Carlo simulation. In the appendix, we show that our model, when 
applied to the data from Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), produces management estimates that are 
approximately 90% correlated with the measure in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). 
Given the above, we model a production function as follows:2    
                                                 
2 We prefer to model a production function for two reasons. First, management directly enters the production function 
as a latent input. In contrast, cost and profit equations are functions of input prices (and not input quantities), which 
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 𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡         (1) 
where q represents the output of firm i in year t and 𝑥 is the vector of inputs, including management 
(m). For the estimation, we use a translog specification, which has the appealing properties of 
flexibility and linearity in the parameters, and is thus the one favored in the literature (e.g., Greene, 
2008).   
 Firm-year data for the estimation of equations (1) and (2) are from Compustat for the period 
1980–2016. We proxy firm output using the log of sales, which reflects how well managers 
maximize revenue. To measure capital, we use the log of the sum of the dollar amount of net 
property, plant, and equipment; net operating leases; net R&D; purchased goodwill; other 
intangible assets; and cost of inventory. To measure labor we use the log of the number of 
employees. The choice of these inputs is justified based on their contributions to the generation of 
sales revenue and the role of managers in determining their level.  
 We estimate equation (1) using Bayesian techniques. We prefer Bayesian over simple 
structural equation modelling for three reasons. First, we have very good priors on explanatory 
variables, owing to Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and their data set. Given that we optimally 
need one or more variables to approximate management practices, the priors help with better 
approximation compared to structural equation modelling. Second, structural equation modelling 
estimated via maximum likelihood usually encounters convergence problems, and our model is no 
exception. Third, and quite important, subject to good priors, specific Bayesian techniques are not 
overly sensitive when changing the determinants of the latent variable.  
                                                 
imply transformations including the share equations to estimate management practices. Second, estimation of the 
production function implies that we do not need data on management compensation (i.e., the price of management 
quality), which in principle had to be another latent variable in the model. This increases the estimation complexity, 
potentially introducing further bias in our estimates. 
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 For estimation, we assume that the vector of inputs contains unity, so that the first element 
of β in equation (1) is a random firm-specific intercept. For latent management practices, we 
assume:  
 𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡         (2)  
where the vector z includes lagged values of x, as well as current and lagged values of the price of 
labor in logs (the ratio of total personnel expenses to the total number of full-time equivalent 
employees).  
The assumption on the determinants of m is also directly guided by economics and 
management theory. Specifically, we assume that the use of inputs in optimal quantities and their 
allocation determines the quality of management. We use the previous quarter’s input quantities 
to reduce simultaneity concerns, even though we find no significant differences in the results when 
using contemporaneous quantities. Also, including the price of labor follows the corporate 
governance literature identifying compensation as a positive correlate of ability and human capital 
(e.g., Custódio et al., 2013) and serves as an external instrument. Identification through input prices 
has a long tradition in the production economics literature (e.g., Nevo, 2001). In our case, where 
we assume the labor market is fairly competitive, the price of labor can be a valid instrument 
(Ackerberg et al., 2006).3 
                                                 
3 For the price of labor to be a valid instrument in equation (2), the identification condition is that it is uncorrelated 
with the production function residuals u. For this to hold, we must exclude a number of possibilities. First and 
foremost, the price of labor needs to strongly affect m. Theoretically, this must hold, as a higher price of labor should 
reflect better management practices in a competitive labor market. Empirically, we find that this is indeed the case. 
Second, these prices should not directly affect (enter) the production of firm output. By construction, the production 
function has this property. Third, and related to the first, the labor market needs to be perfectly competitive so that 
each firm separately has no effect on market prices. The size and depth of the markets considered should mean that, 
at least in our data set, this property is satisfied. Fourth, input prices should vary sufficiently to allow for good 
econometric identification. Our labor prices vary by firm-year so that this condition is also met.  
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Using the WMS data from Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and a simple OLS regression of 
inputs on output in that data set, we choose our priors for inputs as follows (we drop subscript t 
for simplicity):4  
 𝛽𝑖 ≡ [𝛽𝑖1, 𝛽𝑖𝑁],  i = 1,…,N,         (3) 
with:  
 𝛽𝑖~𝑁𝑘−1(0.51𝑘−1, ℎ𝛽
2 𝛪𝜅−1)        (4) 
so that most of these coefficients are in the (0, 1) interval with 95% prior probability and 𝛪𝜅−1 is 
a vector of ones in ℝ𝑘−1. For the management component, we prefer to be a priori agnostic and 
assume an uninformative prior:5 
 𝛽𝑖𝑚~𝑁𝑘−1(?̅?, ℎ𝛾
2)          (5) 
where ?̅? = 0.8 and ℎ𝛾 = 10
3. For the estimation of equation (2) we have:  
 𝛿𝑖~𝑁dim⁡(𝛿)(𝛿̅𝛪dim⁡(𝑑), ℎ𝛿
2𝛪dim⁡(𝛿))       (6) 
where dim denotes the dimension of the corresponding vectors, 𝛿̅ = 0, and ℎ𝛿 = 10
3, so that these 
priors are relatively diffuse. Also, we allow for different treatment of initial conditions: 
 𝑚𝑖0~𝑁(0, 10
4)         (7) 
which is practically also diffuse. Thus, we apply here the principle of indifference, which assigns 
equal probabilities to all possibilities for management practices. For the intercept, results in the 
literature are mixed and thus we assume a nearly flat prior: 
 𝛽𝑖~𝑁(0, 10
4)          (8) 
                                                 
4 For the estimation of priors, we use log of sales as firm output and the logs of labor and capital as inputs. We choose 
the same priors for all inputs. This is not a problem, given that we allow variation given the probabilistic framework 
of the Bayesian method.    
5 This also does not play much role in our end estimates of management practices. Using the distributional information 
from Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) to construct more informative priors yields very similar results.   
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 As is standard practice in the Bayesian literature, we resort to Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods of inference. MCMC can be implemented using a Gibbs sampler where all 
posterior conditional distributions are in well-known families.6 We run the Gibbs sampler for 
150,000 iterations and burn the first 50,000 to mitigate possible start-up effects. We successfully 
test convergence using Geweke's (1992) diagnostic; autocorrelation in MCMC never exceeds 
approximately 0.40 for any parameter. 
 Using the model described by equations (1) and (2) and the estimation method of equations 
(3) to (8), we obtain a mean value of management practices equal to 1.51 and standard deviation 
equal to 0.299. Also, our measure takes values between 0.421 and 3.101. In table A2 of the 
appendix, we report average estimates of management practices by industry and year. We observe 
a similar level of skill across industries, which is intuitive as there is a priori no reason that more 
skillful individuals are employed in specific industries. The industries with the highest average 
management index values are utilities, telephone/TV, and finance. Nonetheless, the finance 
industry has some of the lowest scores in some cases. Other industries that score low in terms of 
management practices are durables and chemicals.  
 It is perhaps important to note here that the numerous assumptions made in estimating the 
latent-variable model, including assumptions about the data and variables, priors, and functional 
forms, are decided based on both theory but also on our results’ capacity to approximate the state-
of-the art measure of the WMS. In the appendix, we show that when we apply our model to the 
data from the WMS, we achieve an approximately 90% correlation with the index in Bloom and 
Van Reenen (2007), which is derived from the survey data without any formal estimation of a 
production relation. In principle, this validation approach is convincing because such high 
                                                 
6 For brevity, these details are available on request. 
15 
 
correlations are not easy to obtain. Delis and Tsionas (2017) conduct an out-of-sample Monte 
Carlo analysis to further validate the estimation of management practices from a latent-variable 
model.7    
 
3. M&A sample, CAR estimation, and summary statistics 
We draw M&A data from the Thomson One Banker database for January 1, 1980, to December 
31, 2016. The data-selection process follows the five restrictions imposed by Fuller et al. (2002), 
Masulis et al. (2007), and Golubov et al. (2015). Specifically, (i) the bidder is a U.S. publicly listed 
company, and the target is either a public, private, or subsidiary U.S. company; (ii) the acquisition 
is complete; (iii) the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target prior to the acquisition and 100% 
after; (iv) the transaction is at least 1% of the bidder’s market capitalization 11 days prior to the 
announcement and it exceeds $1 million in value; and (v) multiple deals within the same day for 
the same acquirer are excluded.  
 We end up with 15,261 events. From this sample, we drop observations lacking 
information on the variables needed to estimate management practices and on some of our 
important controls used in the baseline specifications. Our final sample has 8,106 events. We 
provide variable definitions and data sources in table 1 and summary statistics in table 2. Following 
Fuller et al. (2002) and Golubov et al. (2015), we carry out our analysis using three samples. The 
first includes all deals (full sample), the second includes acquirers that completed at least five deals 
within a three-year time window (frequent acquirers), and the third includes acquirers who 
completed at least two deals within a three-year window (occasional acquirers). This practice 
allows us to study persistence in acquirers’ returns and use acquirer fixed effects. The sample of 
                                                 
7 Without condemning previous methods using DEA techniques to estimate management practices, the recent literature 
shows that these techniques fail to pass validation using the WMS data or Monte Carlo methods. 
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frequent acquirers includes 1,319 deals, and the sample of occasional acquirers includes 5,487 
deals.  
 Using firm fixed effects is very important because it disentangles the time-invariant firm 
characteristics from our time-variant (firm-year) measure of management practices. In our view, 
management practices, as defined in our context, are dynamic through a learning-by-doing process 
and the addition of new managers and executives. In that sense, and unlike previous studies, we 
examine the role of time-varying, firm-specific management practices in M&A success.8  
 [Please insert tables 1&2 about here]  
 Estimating CARs is based on the market model (MacKinlay, 1997). Specifically, we 
calculate the return on stocks that use the value-weighted index obtained from CRSP as a 
benchmark. The estimation period is (-300, -91) days before the announcement. In mathematical 
terms, the model is:  
 𝑅𝐸𝑇 =⁡𝛽0 +𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑃 + 𝑢      (9) 
We then predict 𝑅𝐸?̂?. Next, we calculate the abnormal return for the event window as follows: 
 𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝐸𝑇 −⁡𝑅𝐸?̂?         (10) 
Finally, we sum the abnormal return (AR) to obtain CAR.  
 Table A3 in the appendix reports average CAR (-2, +2) values for the period 1980–2016 
for 12 different industries. The highest values are in the telephone/TV and consumer (durables and 
nondurables) industries. However, some of these industries perform either superbly or very poorly 
around the events, indicating high volatility. 
                                                 
8 This comes at the cost of being unable to conduct any meaningful analysis on target firms and their management 
practices. The reason is that we limit our sample to firms with repeated acquisitions and, thus, a reduced sample of 
M&As. The sample of targets then becomes quite small because target firm information in Compustat is quite limited 
(targets are quite often small firms that are not covered in Compustat).  
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 Table 3 reports distributional information on the management practices index and three 
different CARs (three-, five-, and 11-day windows around an M&A). The statistics show that the 
management quality of the lowest 1% is slightly less than 1, but for the top 1% this value surpasses 
2. This indicates that management practices among top performers are about 2.14 (2.076/0.970) 
times better than those among low performers. The range between the 75th and 25th quartile is 
about 0.50 points, which accounts for about one-third of the mean value of the management 
practices index.  
 As expected, there are considerable differences in abnormal returns. For the bottom 1% of 
performers, the returns are negative and span from -28.2% for CAR (-5, +5) to -18.4% for CAR (-
1, +1). In contrast, the top 1% performers have returns spanning from 25.1% to 35.3%. Hence, the 
average difference in cumulative returns between top and bottom performers is about 50%. With 
an average of 8.2%, the interquartile difference ranges from 6.3% (for the three-day window) to 
10.5% (for the 11-day window). This indicates that for a market capitalization of $3,588 million 
(the mean in our sample), moving from an acquirer in the first quartile to an acquirer in the third 
quartile will result in gains of about $294.2 million.  
 Solitary events of firms that appear once in our sample can drive this number—and thus 
drive our results in a specific direction. We therefore show statistics for frequent and occasional 
acquirers. Occasional acquirers tend to have, on average, slightly lower CAR interquartile ranges 
compared to frequent acquirers (8% versus 8.4%). Hence, the mean interquartile value for frequent 
acquirers translates into almost $301.4 million. It is worth noticing that the median value of CARs 
is very low (1.4%). That is, the average acquirer has an anemic positive outcome from M&A 
activities, revealing that acquirers are either extremely good or bad performers (similar findings 
occur in Golubov et al., 2015, and Gompers et al., 2010). 
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[Please insert table 3 about here] 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Empirical model and results without management 
The regression for the benchmark model is: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (11) 
where 𝛹 and 𝛺 are vectors of firm and deal characteristics, respectively, and 𝜇 and 𝜈 are firm and 
year fixed effects. Definitions for all variables in this model are in table 1, and summary statistics 
are in table 2. 
 For comparative purposes with benchmark empirical studies, we first estimate a CAR (-2, 
+2) model without our management index (e.g., Masulis et al., 2007; Bao and Edmans, 2011; 
Golubov et al., 2012; Harford et al., 2012). In table 4 we report our findings for the full sample, as 
well as for frequent and occasional acquirers. These findings are very similar to those in the 
benchmark studies. Specifically, acquirer size, buying public targets using stock, and Tobin’s q 
enter with a negative and highly significant coefficient.9 In contrast, relative size, buying private 
targets using stock, and buying subsidiary targets with cash have a positive and significant effect 
on CARs.10 Variables such as relatedness and free cash flow have marginally significant effects in 
the full sample.   
                                                 
9 The latter result highlights that Tobin’s q, previously a measure of management quality (e.g., Lang et al. 1989), does 
not properly reflect this quality. 
10 Previous research documents that the payment method for M&As matters. Specifically, Travlos (1987) and Franks 
et al. (1988) find that cumulative abnormal returns are higher when acquirers pay with cash instead of equity. Using 
stock to pay for acquisitions may signal firm internal problems that may lead to a decrease in the acquirer’s value. 
That is, firms could be overvalued and thus sell their stock (see also Myers and Majluf, 1984; Baker and Wurgler, 
2002; Jensen, 2005; Golubov et al., 2016). As far as private/subsidiary targets are concerned, Fuller et al. (2002) find 
higher CARs for firms that acquire targets with stock.  
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What is crucial to notice here is the very low explanatory power of the models, with the R-
squared and adjusted R-squared being 4.5% and 4.3%, respectively, in the full sample. This level 
of explanatory power is highlighted in Moeller et al. (2004), Masulis et al. (2007), Harford et al. 
(2012), and Golubov et al. (2015), among others. 
[Please insert table 4 about here] 
 
4.2. Baseline results with management 
We report our baseline results of the effect of management practices on CAR (-2, +2) in table 5. 
In the first three columns we report results without acquirer and year fixed effects, which are added 
in the last three columns. Management practices enters with the expected positive sign and it is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The coefficient estimate for the full 
sample and without (with) fixed effects equals 6.6% (5.1%). The finding in column (1) indicates 
that a one-standard-deviation increase in Management practices (equal to 0.299), increases CAR 
by 0.020 (obtained from 0.299*0.066). Given that the mean CAR in our sample is 0.014, this 
increase is more than 100%. Similarly, the coefficient on Management practices in column (4) 
shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in management practices increases CAR by 0.015 
points. We document equivalently large increases for frequent and occasional acquirers. We find 
that the coefficient is larger for frequent acquirers compared to occasional acquirers, indicating 
that frequent acquirers possess management practices that are crucial for the success of M&As. 
[Please insert table 5 about here] 
 To make the importance of our findings more explicit, in table A4 in the appendix, we 
report the standardized (beta) coefficients of table 5. These statistics allow for a direct comparison 
of the relative effects of the explanatory variables of CARs, showing that Management practices 
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is the most important variable in explaining a firm’s CAR following M&A in the models without 
fixed effects. In the models with fixed effects, the potency of the effect of Management practices 
on CARs is second only to acquirer size. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the adjusted R-squared 
of the models in table 5 (0.091) substantially increases (more than doubles) compared to the one 
in table 4 (0.043). These results highlight the importance of including our management practices 
index in the CAR model.  
 The role of fixed effects also deserves special mention. The use of fixed effects increases 
the adjusted R-squared by about 3.4 points when using the full sample. Comparing the same 
specifications, the coefficient on Management practices decreases from 0.066 in models without 
fixed effects to 0.0513 in models with fixed effects. This decrease implies a decline from a 0.020 
point increase in CAR to a 0.015 point increase in CAR when increasing Management practices 
by one standard deviation.11 The 0.005 difference is statistically significant at the 1% level 
(obtained from a Hausman test) and indicates that part of Management practices is indeed a firm 
fixed effect. However, three-quarters of the effect of management practices remains, even in 
models with fixed effects. This suggests that the role of management practices differs substantially 
from one acquisition to another. Thus, management practices are dynamic in the sense that good 
management implies adaptation to the unique environment surrounding each acquisition.  
  
4.3. Sensitivity to additional control variables 
                                                 
11 Naturally, the models with fixed effects have fewer observations. If we reestimate the models without fixed effects 
for the sample of the models with fixed effects, there is no change in our inference. Notably, the year fixed effects do 
not play any role in the results (they are jointly insignificant) and any change in the results between the first three and 
the latter three columns of table 5 come from the firm fixed effects.  
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In this section, we explore the robustness of the effect of management practices once we control 
for a series of variables shown to affect CARs in the literature. Essentially our tests show that our 
management index does not capture the effect of these variables.  
 First, we look into the role of authority within companies, as corporate governance could 
affect shareholder behavior. Gompers et al. (2003) argue for the importance of balance of power 
and use a governance index (G-index) based on anti-takeover provisions to test their hypothesis. 
Lower G-index values indicate relatively democratic firms, while higher values characterize a 
more despotic corporate environment. They find that firms with higher G-index values have lower 
corporate values. Similarly, Bebchuk et al. (2009) construct an entrenchment index (E-index), 
which inter alia accounts for mergers and charter amendments; they find that increases in this 
index are associated with decreases in corporate value and abnormal returns. 
 In table 6 we report results from specifications including the G-index and the E-index. We 
find that both indices enter with insignificant coefficients. In contrast, Management practices 
enters with a positive and highly significant coefficient at the 1% level. The value of the coefficient 
is lower compared to the benchmark model, but this is probably due to the large decrease in sample 
size due to the unavailability of information for newly added indices for a number of firms and 
years. Indeed, using the same observations as in table 6 and our baseline specification (column 4 
of table 5), the results are equivalent to those reported in table 6.  
[Please insert table 6 about here] 
 Second, management practices might erroneously capture the effect of time-varying 
corporate governance characteristics, such as compensation and experience of the top-management 
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team.12 We include the relevant variables and report the results in table 7. Again, our management 
index enters with a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% level. Ergo, in the sample where 
all controls are used (column 6) a one-standard-deviation increase in Management practices is 
associated with a 0.011 unit increase in CAR. This effect is economically still very large but 
somewhat smaller than the equivalent in our baseline results. However, as in table 6, this is due to 
the loss in observations and not the inclusion of the additional controls.  
 Regarding the governance characteristics, we find that none of these variables consistently 
has a significant effect on CARs across the six specifications. Thus, management practices are by 
far the most significant governance-related factor in the CAR model.  
[Please insert table 7 about here] 
 In the regressions in table 8, we control for several firm-performance variables, such as 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), annual stock return, net profit margin, capital 
expenditures as a proportion of assets (CAPX), and industry sales Herfindahl. This could be an 
important addition to our baseline specification because our index should strictly capture 
management practices and not the overall performance of firms.  
 We find that the effect of Management practices changes only slightly from the baseline 
specifications of table 5, indicating that our main finding is robust to the inclusion of firm-
performance indicators. In the specification where most controls are included (column 8), a one-
standard-deviation increase in Management practices leads to a 0.015 point increase in CAR 
(exactly the same as our baseline specification). As for the performance-related variables, we find 
                                                 
12 The top-management team includes individuals above the vice president level and thus can be considered senior 
executives (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). For relevant empirical studies, see Gabaix and Landier (2008), Tervio 
(2008), Edmans et al. (2009), Custódio et al. (2013). 
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that net profit margin is the most important (negative) determinant of M&A success, while ROE, 
annual stock return, and industry sales Herfindahl are marginally statistically significant variables.  
 The results regarding net profit margin are somewhat puzzling, however. We expect that 
firms with more cash flow are more capable of creating firm value through M&As. A potential 
answer to this puzzle could be that profitability indices do not necessarily capture firm 
characteristics—including management practices—that are of high importance in value creation 
through M&As. The negative coefficient on industry sales Herfindahl could signal inefficiencies 
that are more pronounced in more concentrated sectors, where firms live the quite life (Hicks, 
1935).   
[Please insert able 8 about here] 
 A last set of additional control variables that could affect the relation between effective 
management and CARs concerns industry characteristics. Several papers allude to the role of 
industry characteristics in M&A value creation. For example, one strand of literature argues that 
efficiency problems occur more in conglomerates (e.g., Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 
2000). Lang and Stulz (1994) show that multisegment firms have lower Tobin’s q values. In the 
same spirit, Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that conglomerates are worth about 15% less than stand-
alone firms. On the other hand, conglomerates allocate capital better due to their centralized control 
(e.g., Stein, 1997). Similar arguments are in the literature on the role of technology and innovation.  
 We add three controls to examine whether the acquirer and the target (i) belong to the same 
Fama-French industry (Conglomerate), (ii) belong to high-tech industries (TECH), and (iii) have 
high R&D intensity (RD intensity). Given that our aim is to identify industry characteristics as 
variables potentially biasing our estimates on Management practices and not to identify the mere 
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effect of industry characteristics, we also saturate the model using Fama-French industry fixed 
effects.  
 We report the results in table 9. If anything, in the last specification (column 7), our 
management practices index enters with a slightly larger coefficient compared to the baseline 
specification. A one-standard-deviation increase in Management practices implies a higher CAR 
(-2, +2) by approximately 0.018 points. As far as the other controls are concerned, the model in 
column (7) indicates that firms with higher R&D intensity tend to have lower CAR values, while 
Conglomerate enters with a negative yet insignificant coefficient. Further, TECH does not seem 
to affect CARs, as the coefficients we obtain are negative yet insignificant. We should note here, 
however, that the large set of fixed effects might oversaturate the model and prevent proper 
identification of the effect of industry characteristics. 
[Please insert table 9 about here] 
 
4.4. Sensitivity to the definition of CARs and outliers 
To ensure that our results are not driven by the time around the events, we repeat the previous 
models with CARs calculated over three- and 11-day windows. The results are in table 10 and are 
almost identical to those obtained in the baseline models. For example, for frequent acquirers and 
using fixed effects, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant with a value of 0.0587 
for CAR (-1, +1) and 0.0558 for CAR (-5, +5). These values are almost identical to the value of 
0.0564 reported in table 5.  
[Please insert table 10 about here] 
 Finally, we look into the possibility that outliers drive our results. For this reason, we 
winsorize our variables at the 1% and 99% levels and repeat our analysis. The results in table 11 
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remain highly significant, although now the coefficient on Management practices is somewhat 
smaller. For example, for the benchmark model for the frequent acquirers, the coefficient is 0.0368 
(as opposed to 0.0564). We should note, however, that dropping outliers might create downward 
bias on the effect of management practices because we exclude the extraordinary performers in 
terms of management quality.13 
[Please insert table 11 about here] 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the M&A literature in three interrelated ways. First and most important, 
we measure management practices using standard microeconomic and management theory and 
show that our measure is the most significant explanatory variable in empirical models of M&A 
success. Essentially, including management practices doubles the explanatory power of these 
models, with a one-standard-deviation increase in our index doubling CARs around M&A deals.  
Second, we provide a new time- and firm-variant measure of management practices that 
corroborates the broad definition of management theory and aligns with the production economics 
literature. Our analysis shows that the effect of management practices on M&A success comes 
over and above previously used characteristics of the firm and its governance, as well as time-
invariant acquirer characteristics. Thus, we contend that the effect of management practices is 
indeed time-variant and cannot be solely attributed to experience, previous success, or other 
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.  
                                                 
13 The respective exclusion of the observations with low Management practices does not seem to play a major role. 
This is because the distribution of Management practices is leptokurtic, implying relatively concentrated scores across 
firms, and negatively skewed (skewed to the right), implying that relatively few firms have very low Management 
practices scores and the mean scores are closer to the maximum value. 
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Third, our analysis brings together three rather distinct literatures in corporate finance, 
management, and production economics. This synthesis, allows the measurement of management 
practices in a way that significantly predicts M&A success. In turn, the synthesis of the literatures 
is a first step toward examining other more specific theories. One such extension resides in 
reexamining the relation between management practices and corporate characteristics such as CEO 
turnover, board independence, and female participation on the board. Further, our analysis 
provides incentives to reexamine the relation between the quality of managerial practices and 
executive or employee compensation. Finally, our approach to estimating management practices 
via a latent variable model might provide new ideas for modelling notions that, by their own nature, 
are unobserved. These include but are not limited to social corporate responsibility, corporate 
culture, and accounting practices such as earnings management and profit-shifting. We leave these 
ideas as a desideratum for future research. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Description 
 
Return variables and antitakeover indexes  
CAR (-2, +2) 
 
Five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of acquirer firm’s stock, i.e. in the (-2, +2) 
days surrounding the announcement date. CAR is calculated using the market model and 
the benchmark is the CRSP value weighted index. Model parameters are estimated over (-
300, -91) days before the announcement.  
Past RET Average CAR of the acquisitions completed by an acquirer over the past three calendar 
years. 
Future RET Average CAR of the acquisitions completed by an acquirer in the period one to five calendar 
years in the future. 
GIM index The Governance Index of Gompers et al. (2003) that accounts for 24 anti-takeover 
provisions. 
E-Index The entrenchment index based on Bebchuk et al. (2009).  
 
Bidder characteristics 
Management practices Estimates of good management practices obtained from a production function and the 
method of Delis and Tsionas (2017). 
Ln(acquirer size) The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s equity 11 days prior to the M&A 
announcement date. The data are in million dollars and are obtained from CRSP. 
Run-up Bidder’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return for the window (-210, -11) days. Data are 
from CRSP. 
Sigma Standard deviation of a bidder’s market-adjusted daily returns for the time window (-210, -
11). Data are from CRSP. 
Free cash flow [(Operating income before depreciation - total interest and related expenses - total income 
taxes - capital expenditures)/(close price x common shares outstanding)]. In Compustat 
coding: [(oibdp - xint - txt -capx)/(prcc_c (x) csho)]. 
Tobin’s q The calculation of Tobin’s q in Compustat is: [at + csho (x) prcc_f – ceq]/at. The values are 
taken for the fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
Leverage (Total debt in current liabilities + long-term debt)/total assets (Compustat: (dlc + dltt)/at]. 
Tech = 1 if both the bidder and the target belong to high tech industries. Based on Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Masulis et al. (2007), and Harford et al. (2012) 
tech firms have the following four digit SIC codes: 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 
3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 
4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379. 
Tech target = 1 if the target belongs to a high tech industry (as defined above) and = 0 otherwise. 
Conglomerate = 1 if the acquirer and the target are in different Fama-French industries and = 0 otherwise. 
R&D intensity R&D expenses divided by total assets (Compustat: xrd/ta). 
R&D high = 1 if R&D intensity for a specific firm is above the industry median and = 0 otherwise. 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes over total assets (Compustat: ebit/at). The values are 
computed in the fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
Low_ROA = 1 if the ROA of a firm is lower than the average of the sector and = 0 otherwise. The 
values are computed for the fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
ROE Net income over total assets (Compustat: ni/at). The values are computed for the fiscal year 
prior to the acquisition. 
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Annual stock return A firm’s stock return on a yearly basis. It is calculated using Compustat data in the following 
manner: [(prcc_f(t)/ajex(t) + dvpsx_f(t)/ ajex(t))/(prcc_f(t-1)/ajex_f(t-1))]. See also 
Custódio et al. (2013). 
CAPX Capital expenditures over total assets (Compustat: capx/at). 
Net profit margin Net income over sales (Compustat: ni/sale).  
Industry sales Herfindahl As in Custódio et al. (2013), this Herfindahl index is based on a firm’s sales. The 
computation utilizes Compustat’s SALE variable. Computations are based on the two-digit 
SIC industry codes.   
 
Deal characteristics 
Relative size The deal value (from Thomson One Banker) divided by the market value (CRSP) 11 days 
prior to the deal announcement. 
Relatedness = 1 if bidder and target are in the same two-digit SIC code and = 0 otherwise. Data are from 
Thomson One Banker. 
Friendly merger = 1 if the merger is characterized as such in Thomson One Banker and = 0 otherwise. 
Hostile merger Same as above. 
Neutral merger Same as above. 
Public (cash)  = 1 for acquisition of public targets that have been financed with cash and = 0 otherwise. 
Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Public (stock) = 1 for acquisition of public targets that have been financed with stock and = 0 otherwise. 
Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Private (cash) = 1 for acquisition of private targets that have been financed with cash and = 0 otherwise. 
Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Private (stock) = 1 for acquisition of private targets that have been financed with stock and = 0 otherwise. 
Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Subsidiary (cash) = 1 if acquisition of a subsidiary target that have been finance with cash and = 0 otherwise. 
Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
 
CEO and management team characteristics 
Above vice-president The number of people who are in a position above that of a vice-president in the fiscal year 
prior to the M&A announcement (calculation based on Execucomp data). 
Age1  The average age of the individuals who are above the position of the vice-president in the 
fiscal year prior to the announcement date (data from Execucomp). 
Age2 Executive age in the year prior to the announcement date (data from Compustat). 
Cash pay Total current compensation (Execucomp: total_curr). 
Total pay Total pay for the CEO in thousands of dollars (Execucomp: tdc1). 
Equity pay Restricted stock granted + options granted (in thousands of dollars). In Execucomp: rstkgrnt 
+ option_awards_blk_value. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
CAR (-2, +2) 0.014 0.008 0.090 -0.663 1.486 8,106 
CAR (-1, +1) 0.013 0.006 0.080 -0.675 1.456 8,106 
CAR (-5, +5) 0.014 0.009 0.116 -0.972 1.603 8,106 
GIM index 9.298 9 2.718 2 17 799 
E-index 2.402 2 1.249 0 6 1,003 
Management practices 1.512 1.513 0.299 0.421 3.101 8,106 
Ln(acquirer size) 6.260 6.238 1.876 0.412 12.978 8,106 
Run-up 0.122 0.099 0.224 -0.994 2.030 8,106 
Sigma 0.030 0.027 0.016 0.007 0.192 8,106 
Free cash flow 0.003 0.033 0.229 -10.977 2.423 8,106 
Tobin's Q 2.164 1.639 2.324 0.258 48.839 8,106 
Leverage 0.219 0.190 0.201 0 1.406 8,106 
TECH 0.219 0 0.413 0 1 8,106 
TECH target 0.272 0 0.445 0 1 8,106 
Conglomerate 0.400 0 0.490 0 1 8,106 
RD intensity 0.061 0.034 0.080 0 1.124 4,842 
ROA 0.085 0.096 0.130 -2.112 0.590 8,106 
ROE 0.034 0.000 0.145 -3.007 0.445 8,106 
Annual stock return 1.363 0.053 8.246 0.004 730.446 7,889 
CAPX_AT 0.065 1.095 0.082 0 1.978 8,102 
Net profit margin -0.074 0.042 3.357 -285.696 6.978 8,100 
Industry sales Herfindahl  0.293 0.050 0.244 0 1 8,106 
Relative size 0.231 0.216 0.523 0.01 23.261 8,106 
Relatedness 0.600 0.090 0.490 0 1 8,106 
Friendly merger 0.994 1 0.074 0 1 8,106 
Hostile merger 0.003 1 0.059 0 1 8,106 
Neutral merger 0.001 0 0.038 0 1 8,106 
Public (paid with cash) 0.054 0 0.225 0 1 8,106 
Public (paid with stocks) 0.046 0 0.210 0 1 8,106 
Private (paid with cash) 0.119 0 0.324 0 1 8,106 
Private (paid with stocks) 0.067 0 0.250 0 1 8,106 
Subsidiary (paid with cash) 0.124 0 0.330 0 1 8,106 
Above vice-president 4.743 5 1.523 1 11 3,721 
Average age (above vice-president) 64.755 64 7.777 32 94 3,513 
Average age (executives) 53.167 53 5.595 35.667 78 3,112 
Cash pay for CEO (in thousand) 1,195.826 858.617 1,899.304 2.535 36,812.51 3,351 
Total pay for CEO (in thousand) 5,178.175 2,866.143 8,625.244 10 140,724.30 3,330 
Equity pay for CEO (in thousand) 2,984.136 909.242 8,540.830 0 140,340.80 2,032 
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Table 3: Percentile statistics  
This table reports distribution characteristics for management practices and CAR measured over different 
time windows (2 days, 5 days, and 11 days). CAR is calculated based on the market model. We report 
characteristics for the whole sample, for frequent acquirers and for occasional acquirers. Definitions of all 
variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
Statistics     Management practices CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) 
Panel A: Whole sample 
1st percentile 0.970 -0.184 -0.208 -0.282 
5th percentile 1.049 -0.090 -0.111 -0.155 
10th percentile 1.109 -0.058 -0.074 -0.104 
25th percentile 1.260 -0.021 -0.028 -0.042 
50th percentile (median) 1.513 0.006 0.008 0.009 
75th percentile 1.757 0.042 0.050 0.064 
90th percentile 1.918 0.095 0.109 0.138 
95th percentile 1.974 0.136 0.158 0.197 
99th percentile 2.076 0.251 0.282 0.353 
p75-p25 (interquartile range) 0.496 0.063 0.077 0.105 
Panel B: Frequent acquirers 
1st percentile 0.989 -0.158 -0.197 -0.290 
5th percentile 1.068 -0.089 -0.116 -0.164 
10th percentile 1.117 -0.061 -0.078 -0.109 
25th percentile 1.285 -0.021 -0.028 -0.043 
50th percentile (median) 1.507 0.009 0.008 0.009 
75th percentile 1.757 0.044 0.052 0.063 
90th percentile 1.918 0.097 0.108 0.140 
95th percentile 1.976 0.128 0.159 0.207 
99th percentile 2.085 0.248 0.279 0.344 
p75-p25 (interquartile range) 0.472 0.065 0.081 0.106 
Panel B: Occasional acquirers 
1st percentile 0.976 -0.174 -0.205 -0.274 
5th percentile 1.057 -0.088 -0.108 -0.153 
10th percentile 1.115 -0.057 -0.073 -0.103 
25th percentile 1.262 -0.020 -0.028 -0.040 
50th percentile (median) 1.509 0.006 0.007 0.009 
75th percentile 1.757 0.040 0.049 0.063 
90th percentile 1.918 0.092 0.107 0.133 
95th percentile 1.973 0.132 0.155 0.193 
99th percentile 2.060 0.236 0.266 0.317 
p75-p25 (interquartile range) 0.495 0.061 0.077 0.103 
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Table 4: Benchmark regressions (without management) 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (12) without management 
practices. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-
2, +2) around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample, for frequent 
acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event 
window), and for occasional acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least two 
acquisitions within a three-year period). CAR calculation is based on the market model. The 
t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant 
term. Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 Whole sample Frequent Occasional 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0045*** -0.0076*** -0.0051*** 
 (-6.22) (-4.08) (-6.38) 
Run-up -0.0139** -0.0151 -0.0154** 
 (-2.00) (-1.03) (-2.06) 
Sigma 0.2168 0.0798 0.0235 
 (1.39) (0.25) (0.18) 
Relative size 0.0180*** 0.0135 0.0138*** 
 (3.46) (1.34) (2.87) 
Relatedness 0.0042** -0.0056 0.0042* 
 (2.12) (-1.11) (1.84) 
Friendly merger 0.0117 -0.0399*** 0.0066 
 (0.47) (-6.92) (0.17) 
Hostile merger 0.0099 -0.0446 -0.0035 
 (0.35) (-1.59) (-0.08) 
Neutral merger 0.0230 -0.0687*** -0.0073 
 (0.61) (-7.03) (-0.17) 
Public (cash) 0.0037 0.0009 0.0042 
 (1.01) (0.08) (0.92) 
Public (stock) -0.0288*** -0.0357*** -0.0307*** 
 (-5.71) (-3.33) (-5.09) 
Private (cash) 0.0011 0.0057 0.0003 
 (0.40) (0.78) (0.10) 
Private (stock) 0.0176*** 0.0077 0.0190*** 
 (3.46) (0.85) (3.23) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0104*** -0.0079 0.0073** 
 (3.48) (-0.91) (2.08) 
Free cash flow 0.0014 0.0125*** 0.0064 
 (0.26) (3.69) (1.39) 
Tobin’s q -0.0021*** -0.0008 -0.0018*** 
 (-3.78) (-0.95) (-3.21) 
Leverage 0.0103* 0.0022 0.0023 
 (1.75) (0.21) (0.36) 
Observations 8,106 1,319 5,487 
R-squared 0.045 0.047 0.039 
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.036 0.036 
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Table 5: Benchmark model with management 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (12) with management practices. The dependent variable 
is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The results are for the 
whole sample, for frequent acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event 
window), and for occasional acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least two acquisitions within a three-year 
period). CAR calculation is based on the market model. The t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The last three specifications 
include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their 
sources are in Table 1. 
 Whole sample Frequent Occasional Whole sample Frequent Occasional 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Management practices 0.0660*** 0.0583*** 0.0542*** 0.0513*** 0.0564*** 0.0490*** 
 (13.51) (6.48) (12.07) (11.72) (6.11) (9.37) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0044*** -0.0072*** -0.0050*** -0.0113*** -0.0230*** -0.0159*** 
 (-6.28) (-4.05) (-6.48) (-4.69) (-3.99) (-4.80) 
Run-up -0.0137** -0.0106 -0.0151** -0.0113 -0.0073 -0.0073 
 (-2.06) (-0.79) (-2.09) (-1.39) (-0.42) (-0.76) 
Sigma 0.1939 0.0336 0.0145 0.0348 -0.2746 -0.0463 
 (1.33) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (-0.56) (-0.19) 
Relative size 0.0172*** 0.0100 0.0134*** 0.0147*** 0.0150 0.0092* 
 (3.48) (1.09) (2.89) (3.06) (1.54) (1.74) 
Relatedness 0.0040** -0.0054 0.0040* 0.0015 -0.0111 0.0011 
 (2.05) (-1.11) (1.79) (0.57) (-1.51) (0.37) 
Friendly merger 0.0095 -0.0331*** 0.0059 0.0024 -0.0244 0.0156 
 (0.34) (-5.61) (0.13) (0.07) (-1.50) (0.39) 
Hostile merger 0.0088 -0.0379 -0.0054 -0.0034 -0.0194 0.0123 
 (0.28) (-1.33) (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.75) (0.27) 
Neutral merger 0.0206 -0.0476*** -0.0093 0.0043 -0.0650** 0.0157 
 (0.53) (-4.49) (-0.19) (0.11) (-2.26) (0.33) 
Public (cash) 0.0042 0.0046 0.0052 0.0006 0.0117 0.0063 
 (1.15) (0.45) (1.13) (0.14) (1.01) (1.19) 
Public (stock) -0.0281*** -0.0370*** -0.0303*** -0.0250*** -0.0419*** -0.0269*** 
 (-5.70) (-3.58) (-5.11) (-4.04) (-3.48) (-3.69) 
Private (cash) 0.0012 0.0069 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0029 0.0013 
 (0.44) (0.94) (0.13) (-0.24) (0.33) (0.31) 
Private (stock) 0.0167*** 0.0054 0.0178*** 0.0167*** 0.0002 0.0202*** 
 (3.37) (0.62) (3.12) (2.63) (0.02) (2.76) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0088*** -0.0081 0.0062* 0.0023 -0.0174* 0.0005 
 (3.03) (-0.95) (1.78) (0.71) (-1.68) (0.11) 
Free cash flow 0.0010 0.0112*** 0.0050 0.0055 0.0088** 0.0066 
 (0.21) (3.13) (1.09) (1.32) (2.55) (1.37) 
Tobin’s q -0.0020*** -0.0009 -0.0018*** -0.0016* -0.0011 -0.0017* 
 (-3.73) (-1.01) (-3.07) (-1.72) (-0.70) (-1.68) 
Leverage 0.0105* 0.0036 0.0035 -0.0072 -0.0395 -0.0239 
 (1.83) (0.34) (0.56) (-0.62) (-1.35) (-1.61) 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,106 1,319 5,487 6,922 1,273 5,317 
R-squared 0.093 0.086 0.074 0.347 0.294 0.346 
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.074 0.071 0.125 0.101 0.110 
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Table 6: Controls for governance indices  
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (12) with management practices and additional 
controls for governance indices developed by Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). The dependent 
variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The 
results are for the whole sample. CAR calculation is based on the market model. The t-statistics are clustered at 
the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. All regressions include a constant term and firm and year fixed effects. Definitions of all variables 
along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Management practices 0.0469*** 0.0369*** 0.0404*** 
 (3.54) (3.63) (3.59) 
G-index -0.0040  -0.0032 
 (-0.79)  (-0.62) 
E-index  0.0121 0.0069 
 
 (1.49) (0.75) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 542 655 494 
R-squared 0.481 0.482 0.466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.154 0.127 
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Table 7: Controls for management characteristics 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (12) with management practices and additional controls 
for management characteristics. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) 
around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample. CAR calculation is based on the market model. 
The t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. The last three specifications include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a 
constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Management practices 0.0513*** 0.0345*** 0.0347*** 0.0341*** 0.0338*** 0.0362*** 
 (11.72) (5.94) (5.99) (5.85) (5.82) (4.22) 
 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0008 
 (-0.98) (-1.15) (-1.23) (-1.33) (-1.09) 
 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 
 (0.82) (0.95) (0.95) (0.99) (0.49) 
  -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0026* -0.0033 
  (-1.63) (-1.56) (-1.70) (-1.43) 
Cash pay    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
   (0.60) (0.33) (1.55) 
Total pay     0.0000 -0.0000 
 
    (0.87) (-0.84) 
Equity pay      0.0000 
 
     (1.05) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,922 2,733 2,733 2,720 2,701 1,586 
R-squared 0.347 0.359 0.360 0.349 0.350 0.385 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125 0.131 0.131 0.115 0.115 0.117 
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Table 8: Controls for firm performance 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (12) with management practices and additional controls for firm performance in the fiscal year prior to the 
acquisition. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample. 
CAR calculation is based on the market model. The t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. The last three specifications include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with 
their sources are in Table 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Management practices 0.0513*** 0.0513*** 0.0513*** 0.0500*** 0.0513*** 0.0508*** 0.0511*** 0.0495*** 0.0494*** 
 (11.72) (11.72) (11.71) (11.39) (11.71) (11.67) (11.68) (11.34) (11.31) 
ROA 0.0054       0.0434  
 (0.22)       (1.46)  
Low ROA  0.0014      0.0054  
  (0.43)      (1.37)  
ROE   0.0115      0.0415* 
   (0.58)      (1.89) 
Annual stock return    -0.0000    -0.0000 -0.0000* 
    (-1.57)    (-1.58) (-1.75) 
CAPX     -0.0084   -0.0099 -0.0085 
     (-0.42)   (-0.49) (-0.43) 
Net profit margin      -0.0111**  -0.0124*** -0.0136*** 
      (-2.55)  (-2.70) (-2.81) 
Industry sales Herfindahl       -0.0150** -0.0125* -0.0118* 
 
      (-2.26) (-1.94) (-1.82) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,922 6,922 6,922 6,735 6,920 6,917 6,922 6,728 6,728 
R-squared 0.347 0.347 0.347 0.348 0.347 0.350 0.347 0.352 0.352 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.128 0.125 0.129 0.126 0.133 0.134 
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Table 9: Controls for industry characteristics 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (12) with management practices and additional controls for 
industry characteristics. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the 
announcement date. The results are for the whole sample. CAR calculation is based on the market model. The t-statistics are 
clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The last three specifications include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term. 
Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Management practices 0.0514*** 0.0514*** 0.0514*** 0.0514*** 0.0615*** 0.0615*** 0.0612*** 
 (11.64) (11.64) (11.59) (11.62) (10.22) (10.22) (10.14) 
Conglomerate  -0.0008     -0.0027 
 
 (-0.19)     (-0.48) 
TECH (target)   -0.0071    -0.0147 
 
  (-1.21)    (-1.62) 
TECH (both)    -0.0015   0.0094 
 
   (-0.22)   (0.96) 
RD intensity     -0.0717  -0.0982* 
 
    (-1.28)  (-1.69) 
RD high      0.0035 0.0083 
 
     (0.62) (1.42) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fama-French FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,917 6,917 6,917 6,917 4,064 4,064 4,064 
R-squared 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.391 0.390 0.392 
Adjusted R-squared 0.121 0.120 0.121 0.120 0.145 0.144 0.145 
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Table 10: Alternative CARs. 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (12) with management practices. Instead of CAR 
(-2, +2), we now use CAR (-1, +1) and CAR (-5, +5). Each numbered line corresponds to a column in the previous 
tables. Specifically, lines [1] to [6] of Panel A correspond to columns (1) to (6) of Table 5. Lines [7] to [10] 
correspond to the last column of the Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 respectively. Similarly, for Panel B. We report t-stats 
(clustered at the acquirer level) in parentheses. Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their 
sources are in Table 1. 
  Coef. t-stat R
2 R2-adjusted Obs. 
 Panel A: CAR (-1, +1) 
[1] Full sample, FE = No 0.0709*** 14.24 0.116 0.115 8,106 
[2] Frequent, FE = No 0.0593*** 7.54 0.111 0.100 1,319 
[3] Occasional, FE = No 0.0587*** 14.34 0.099 0.096 5,487 
[4] Full sample, FE = Yes 0.0548*** 13.79 0.374 0.162 6,922 
[5] Frequent, FE = Yes 0.0587*** 7.53 0.327 0.142 1,273 
[6] Occasional, FE = Yes 0.0524*** 11.23 0.377 0.153 5,317 
[7] Governance  0.0372*** 3.76 0.475 0.143 494 
[8] Management  0.0407*** 5.68 0.424 0.172 1586 
[9] Firm performance  0.0529*** 13.37 0.380 0.171 6728 
[10] Industry characteristics 0.0620*** 11.51 0.418 0.182 4064 
 Panel B: CAR (-5, +5) 
[11] Full sample, FE = No 0.0624*** 10.94 0.072 0.070 8,106 
[12] Frequent, FE = No 0.0687*** 5.47 0.076 0.064 1,319 
[13] Occasional, FE = No 0.0522*** 9.41 0.058 0.055 5,487 
[14] Full sample, FE = Yes 0.0459*** 8.92 0.353 0.134 6,922 
[15] Frequent, FE = Yes 0.0558*** 4.88 0.346 0.166 1,273 
[16] Occasional, FE = Yes 0.0446*** 7.33 0.367 0.140 5,317 
[17] Governance  0.0376*** 2.75 0.463 0.123 494 
[18] Management  0.0302*** 3.01 0.377 0.106 1586 
[19] Firm performance  0.0434*** 8.45 0.353 0.135 6,728 
[20] Industry characteristics 0.0556*** 7.83 0.388 0.139 4064 
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Table 11: Winsorized results 
his table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (12) with management practices. All variables (except 
dummies) have been winsorized at the 1% level at both ends. Each numbered line corresponds to a column in the 
previous tables. Specifically, lines [1] to [6] of Panel A correspond to columns (1) to (6) of Table 5. Lines [7] to 
[10] correspond to the last column of the Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 respectively. Similarly, for Panel B. We report t-stats 
(clustered at the acquirer level) in parentheses. Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their 
sources are in Table 1. 
  Coef. t-stat R
2 R2-adjusted Obs. 
 Dependent variable: CAR (-2, +2) 
[1] MA: Full sample, FE = No 0.0356*** 14.78 0.063 0.061 8,225 
[2] 
MA: Frequent acquirers, FE 
= No 0.0352*** 5.52 0.068 0.056 1,364 
[3] 
MA: Occasional acquirers, 
FE = No 0.0331*** 11.29 0.057 0.055 5,605 
[4] MA: Full sample, FE = Yes 0.0312*** 10.56 0.319 0.091 7,044 
[5] 
MA: Frequent acquirers, FE 
= Yes 0.0368*** 5.16 0.258 0.059 1,320 
[6] 
MA: Occasional acquirers, 
FE = Yes 0.0300*** 8.84 0.323 0.082 5,438 
[7] MA (governance) 0.0417*** 3.83 0.439 0.090 507 
[8] MA (management team) 0.0239*** 4.12 0.349 0.070 1618 
[9] MA (sales and assets) 0.0451*** 10.42 0.347 0.129 6843 
[10] MA (tech and industry) 0.0357*** 9.1 0.364 0.111 4147 
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Appendix 
In this appendix, intended for online use only, we first further justify the proper measurement of 
managerial ability and then include three additional tables. To justify our approach, we conduct a 
semi-natural experiment on the basis of data from the WMS. Subsequently, in Table A2, we report 
average values of the estimated management practices index by year and industry. In Table A3, 
we report average CAR values for the (-2, +2) window by year and Fama-French industry. In Table 
A4, we report the standardized coefficients of the results reported in Table 5.    
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Validation of our management practices index 
In this section, we follow Delis and Tsionas (2017) and show that the latent-variable model we use 
to estimate management practices is robust. Specifically, we estimate our model on data from the 
WMS, which is originated in the research by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007; 2010). This is a unique 
survey data set, aiming at thoroughly estimating management practices across several dimensions 
and explaining productivity differences of firms. The nice feature of this data set is that, 
independently from the derivation of the management practices index, it also reports information 
on basic inputs and output of firms. This allows the estimation of our model of equations (1) and 
(2), given equations (3) to (8). Subsequently, we can compare our estimates of management 
practices with the Bloom and Van Reenen scores. 
 We report summary statistics for our management practices index (WMS data) and the 
scores from WMS in Panel A of Table A1. Obviously the two sets of statistics are closely related. 
The correlation coefficient between the two indices is 0.8951. In Panel B, we report the results 
from a bivariate regression of our management practices index on the WMS index. The results 
show that a one point increase in Management practices increases the equivalent measure from 
the WMS by 0.94 points. The R-squared of the regression equals 0.91. The summary statistics, the 
high correlation coefficient, and the regression results show the close resemblance of the two 
management practices indices.    
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Table A1. Management practices estimates vs. WMS scores 
Panel A reports detailed summary statistics (percentiles and smallest 
value, overall mean, standard deviation, variance, skewness and 
kurtosis) for management practices estimates using our model and 
WMS data and management practices scores from the WMS data. 
Panel B reports the results (coefficient estimates and t--statistics) from 
the regression of our management practices estimates on the 
management practices scores from the WMS data set. Stars *** and 
** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A 
Management practices estimates using WMS data 
1% 1.34    
5% 1.88    
10% 2.15    
25% 2.65  Mean 3.23 
50% 3.18  Std. Dev. 0.86 
75% 3.74    
90% 4.20  Skewness -0.24 
95% 4.44  Kurtosis 2.66 
99% 5.02    
Scores from WMS data 
1% 1.42    
5% 1.94    
10% 2.22    
25% 2.72  Mean 3.22 
50% 3.28  Std. Dev. 0.75 
75% 3.78  
90% 4.19  Skewness -0.20 
95% 4.39  Kurtosis 2.59 
99% 4.72    
Panel B 
Regression of management practices estimates on WMS scores 
 0.942***   
 (133.1)   
Constant  0.210**   
  (2.15)   
R-squared  0.91   
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Table A3: Average values of the management practices index by year and industry 
This table presents average values of the management practices index for the whole sample by each year for the twelve Fama-French industries. Some of the industries have 
empty cells, because in the process of calculating the management practices index we had missing observations from Compustat. Apart from the average values of the management 
practices index by year and industry, this table presents the number of best and worst outcomes for each industry within the period 1980-2016 based on our calculations of the 
management practices index. Definitions of all variables along with their sources can be found in Table 1. 
Year All 
Non- 
durables 
Durables Manufacture 
Oil, gas, 
coal 
Chemicals 
Business 
Equipment 
Telephone, 
TV 
Utilities 
Wholesale, 
retail 
Healthcare, 
drugs 
Finance Other 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1980 1.407 1.298  1.620 1.158  1.845 1.516  0.939    
1981 1.525 1.383 1.584 1.414 1.568 1.325 1.482 1.713  1.598 1.591  1.755 
1982 1.523 1.447 1.657 1.577 1.476 1.580 1.439 1.593  1.533 1.464  1.520 
1983 1.528 1.682 1.604 1.425 1.594 1.544 1.494 1.647  1.511 1.444  1.551 
1984 1.497 1.394 1.486 1.515 1.527 1.216 1.489 1.703  1.515 1.655  1.483 
1985 1.500 1.435 1.384 1.487 1.408 1.614 1.593 1.499  1.508 1.250 1.080 1.607 
1986 1.545 1.564 1.778 1.492 1.213 1.495 1.531 1.606  1.626 1.573  1.514 
1987 1.515 1.401 1.446 1.656 1.517 1.499 1.583 1.695  1.412 1.313  1.307 
1988 1.508 1.523 1.429 1.579 1.513 1.678 1.482 1.570  1.514 1.289 1.863 1.404 
1989 1.516 1.358 1.558 1.509 1.578 1.589 1.495 1.432  1.486 1.605  1.584 
1990 1.550 1.464 1.745 1.594 1.641 1.199 1.502 1.645  1.497 1.496 1.530 1.639 
1991 1.523 1.290 1.674 1.355 1.515 1.574 1.511 1.695  1.548 1.543 1.780 1.569 
1992 1.488 1.342 1.476 1.468 1.389 1.515 1.499 1.498  1.637 1.497 1.166 1.528 
1993 1.507 1.602 1.404 1.500 1.524 1.588 1.498 1.591 1.732 1.429 1.511 1.513 1.519 
1994 1.510 1.241 1.486 1.568 1.642 1.648 1.479 1.538  1.455 1.504 1.713 1.520 
1995 1.509 1.491 1.437 1.513 1.552 1.626 1.490 1.515  1.529 1.537  1.485 
1996 1.510 1.431 1.364 1.507 1.486 1.459 1.507 1.519 1.906 1.622 1.515  1.513 
1997 1.526 1.508 1.558 1.589 1.470 1.600 1.512 1.531  1.518 1.447 1.199 1.543 
1998 1.511 1.513 1.444 1.498 1.597 1.548 1.522 1.411  1.538 1.508 1.335 1.498 
1999 1.518 1.507 1.600 1.450 1.485 1.572 1.506 1.650 1.314 1.473 1.502  1.609 
2000 1.506 1.569 1.552 1.607 1.469 1.385 1.529 1.452  1.364 1.420 1.665 1.444 
2001 1.507 1.452 1.603 1.569 1.381 1.494 1.527 1.475  1.381 1.488 1.941 1.461 
2002 1.516 1.514 1.630 1.519 1.547 1.222 1.473 1.635  1.439 1.582 1.817 1.579 
2003 1.511 1.514 1.362 1.532 1.530 1.927 1.490 1.610 1.372 1.599 1.513 1.506 1.437 
2004 1.542 1.610 1.606 1.553 1.497 1.460 1.519 1.727  1.608 1.506 1.798 1.610 
2005 1.444 1.686 1.246 1.367 1.464 1.585 1.422 1.637 1.812 1.451 1.506 1.486 1.365 
2006 1.516 1.309 1.852 1.452 1.500 1.463 1.519 1.723  1.521 1.581 1.342 1.513 
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2007 1.505 1.442 1.394 1.543 1.475 1.416 1.548 1.400  1.479 1.488 1.697 1.461 
2008 1.501 1.415 1.309 1.511 1.413 1.404 1.482 1.339  1.538 1.574 1.894 1.515 
2009 1.523 1.584 1.328 1.524 1.404 1.614 1.510 1.200 1.483 1.796 1.473 1.759 1.590 
2010 1.530 1.540 1.500 1.544 1.595 1.665 1.466 1.456 1.211 1.703 1.546 1.102 1.546 
2011 1.476 1.605 1.277 1.481 1.593 1.549 1.467 1.350  1.582 1.467  1.453 
2012 1.477 1.459 1.142 1.443 1.428 1.437 1.491 1.611  1.469 1.459 1.038 1.522 
2013 1.505 1.477 1.551 1.505 1.399 1.451 1.475 1.615  1.469 1.572  1.526 
2014 1.538 1.604 1.445 1.543 1.624 1.642 1.475 1.522 1.801 1.481 1.627 1.416 1.557 
2015 1.529 1.496 1.552 1.470 1.456 1.396 1.579 1.623  1.474 1.448  1.626 
2016 1.464  1.212 1.415  1.435 1.600   1.373 1.486  1.438 
Avg. 1.508 1.476 1.491 1.511 1.490 1.512 1.514 1.554 1.579 1.503 1.500 1.529 1.522 
# Best  2 4 0 1 4 2 5 4 3 1 9 2 
# Worst  4 9 1 3 6 1 1 1 2 1 7 1 
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Table A4: Average CAR (-2, +2) by year and Fama-French industry 
Cumulative abnormal return, CAR (-2, +2), is calculated two days around the event date. The calculation is based on the market model. Data regarding mergers and acquisitions, 
M&A, are obtained from the Thomson One Banker database for a period covering 1980 to 2016. The 12 industries are based on the Fama-French classification. 
Year All  
Cons. 
non-
durables 
Cons. 
durables 
Man. 
Oil, gas, 
coal 
Chem. 
Business 
equip. 
Tel./TV Utilities 
Whole. 
and retail 
Health.  
and  
drugs 
Finance Other 
1980 1.28% -0.02%  -0.12% -3.19% -6.71% 26.39% 11.45%  -8.20%  1.23%  
1981 -0.90% 2.98% 1.17% -1.25% -0.74% -5.42% -1.16% -1.49% 2.69% -0.26% -1.59% -0.96% -0.64% 
1982 0.18% 1.21% 2.78% 0.47% 0.90% -1.39% 0.48% 0.87% 1.18% 1.08% -3.30% -0.31% 2.09% 
1983 0.27% 1.65% -1.53% 0.14% 1.22% 1.16% -1.33% 0.22% 0.20% 0.01% -2.50% 0.89% 0.40% 
1984 0.30% 1.57% -0.34% 0.69% 1.65% -1.52% 1.49% -1.99% 1.26% 0.65% 5.58% -0.64% -0.17% 
1985 0.55% 0.33% 1.76% 1.54% 0.39% -0.74% 0.53% 2.68% -2.45% -0.44% -0.35% 0.02% 2.04% 
1986 1.03% 1.94% 7.10% 0.08% 3.08% 20.81% -1.33% 1.81% -0.52% 1.57% -1.67% -0.43% 1.59% 
1987 -0.01% 2.04% -0.64% 0.53% -1.17% -0.18% 2.99% 3.60% -2.97% 7.62% 10.47% -2.51% -3.29% 
1988 0.57% -0.98% -0.39% 0.18% 0.15% 1.62% 2.78% 1.80% 2.51% 1.21% 0.99% -0.48% 2.13% 
1989 0.16% 2.12% 0.37% 0.02% 4.36% 2.65% -0.21% 3.03% 1.58% -2.99% -1.40% -0.95% 4.02% 
1990 0.59% 0.48% 3.22% 0.87% 3.38% -1.67% 1.37% -5.85% -0.58% 1.85% -2.66% 0.07% 0.89% 
1991 2.05% 0.24% 5.28% 2.10% 1.06% -1.45% 0.38% 16.53% 13.81% 0.59% 3.32% 1.54% -0.24% 
1992 1.77% 2.61% 4.18% 0.39% 3.98% 3.80% 4.75% 4.40% 9.12% 3.78% 0.21% -0.12% 2.16% 
1993 1.36% -0.35% 0.83% 3.72% 0.69% 0.48% 3.14% 3.43% 1.32% 0.93% 1.99% -0.06% 2.32% 
1994 0.89% -1.71% 1.68% 2.99% 4.92% 5.18% 1.69% -0.88% -3.84% 2.11% 0.34% -0.34% 2.57% 
1995 0.86% 0.18% 1.67% 1.14% 2.05% 1.70% -0.57% 3.32% 1.22% 2.99% 1.79% -0.04% 2.10% 
1996 1.57% 2.02% 3.09% 2.62% 3.41% -0.12% 2.44% 1.71% 0.22% 1.22% 1.24% 0.42% 2.79% 
1997 1.14% 1.90% 1.81% 2.46% 0.71% 4.98% 1.51% 0.01% -0.23% 1.18% -1.10% 0.31% 3.27% 
1998 -0.08% -0.49% 3.40% 1.26% -2.67% -1.60% 0.10% -0.73% 1.65% 1.41% 2.68% -1.08% -0.09% 
1999 1.40% 2.31% 3.58% 2.28% 6.22% 2.71% 2.49% -1.23% -1.08% 2.13% 0.11% -0.08% 1.98% 
2000 -0.17% 0.80% 1.28% 1.13% 0.61% -4.36% -0.92% -1.20% 0.10% 0.87% -1.57% 0.10% -0.07% 
2001 0.71% 0.56% -2.35% 2.20% 0.62% 3.52% 0.23% 2.09% -0.67% 3.11% 1.29% 0.01% 2.44% 
2002 0.47% 1.02% 0.05% 1.29% 1.79% 0.10% 0.76% 3.62% -0.48% 1.88% -0.01% -0.63% 0.63% 
2003 0.96% 3.05% 0.64% 3.28% 0.79% 5.32% 1.42% -3.19% -1.28% 0.33% 1.43% -0.13% 2.43% 
2004 0.50% 2.94% 7.06% 1.24% 0.37% -1.08% -0.44% 4.17% -0.06% 2.18% 1.30% -0.23% 2.36% 
2005 0.62% 2.85% -3.38% 2.35% -0.22% -1.37% 0.59% -0.99% 1.61% 2.62% -0.44% 0.07% 1.93% 
2006 0.65% 2.16% 4.63% 2.25% -3.22% 0.92% 0.61% 2.31% 1.31% 2.36% 1.90% 0.00% 0.71% 
2007 0.63% 0.92% 0.28% 0.98% 2.98% 1.89% 0.03% 0.23% 0.48% 3.19% 1.53% -0.01% 0.13% 
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2008 0.86% 6.67% 0.27% 1.86% 3.59% -3.66% -0.99% -2.22% -0.50% 0.10% 0.13% 0.79% 2.24% 
2009 1.81% 10.53% 2.64% 1.17% 4.91% 7.92% 0.42% 8.22% 0.64% 2.38% 0.11% 2.66% 1.37% 
2010 0.45% -0.78% 2.66% 1.63% -0.31% 0.37% 0.27% -3.10% -1.30% 4.13% 2.74% -0.52% 1.04% 
2011 0.36% 2.31% -1.00% -0.13% 0.64% -1.19% 0.62% 4.34% 0.69% 0.31% 0.79% -0.37% 1.00% 
2012 1.04% 3.74% 0.47% 1.04% 1.29% 5.33% 1.34% -1.70% -0.58% 2.31% -1.59% 0.74% 1.89% 
2013 1.16% 0.53% 1.71% 1.83% -0.16% -0.45% 1.88% 4.78% 1.10% 4.13% 4.52% -0.02% 1.52% 
2014 1.40% 2.28% -0.67% 2.41% -0.64% 1.30% 0.17% -2.04% 0.62% 1.05% 4.98% 0.80% 4.46% 
2015 0.72% 3.06% 0.86% -0.02% -0.39% 3.10% -1.04% 5.54% -2.87% 3.69% 1.66% 0.41% 0.27% 
2016 1.14% -0.83% 8.20% 2.77%  -2.31% 0.69%   4.66% 0.10% -0.13% 4.44% 
Avg. 0.76% 1.67% 1.73% 1.34% 1.20% 1.07% 1.45% 1.77% 0.68% 1.56% 0.92% 0.00% 1.52% 
51 
 
Table A4: Benchmark model with management – Standardized values 
This table reports standardized coefficients from the estimation of equation (10) with management practices. The dependent variable is 
the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample, for 
frequent acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event window), and for occasional 
acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least two acquisitions within a three-year period). CAR calculation is based on the market 
model. The t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer).  Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. The last three specifications include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions 
of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 Whole sample Frequent Occasional Whole sample Frequent Occasional 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Management practices 0.2343*** 0.2069*** 0.1923*** 0.1820*** 0.2002*** 0.1740*** 
 (13.51) (6.48) (12.07) (11.72) (6.11) (9.37) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0932*** -0.1536*** -0.1072*** -0.2390*** -0.4887*** -0.3367*** 
 (-6.28) (-4.05) (-6.48) (-4.69) (-3.99) (-4.80) 
Run-up -0.0353** -0.0273 -0.0390** -0.0291 -0.0189 -0.0189 
 (-2.06) (-0.79) (-2.09) (-1.39) (-0.42) (-0.76) 
Sigma 0.0381 0.0066 0.0029 0.0069 -0.0540 -0.0091 
 (1.33) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (-0.56) (-0.19) 
Relative size 0.1284*** 0.0747 0.1001*** 0.1095*** 0.1118 0.0688* 
 (3.48) (1.09) (2.89) (3.06) (1.54) (1.74) 
Relatedness 0.0233** -0.0317 0.0236* 0.0086 -0.0650 0.0066 
 (2.05) (-1.11) (1.79) (0.57) (-1.51) (0.37) 
Friendly merger 0.0077 -0.0266*** 0.0048 0.0019 -0.0197 0.0126 
 (0.34) (-5.61) (0.13) (0.07) (-1.50) (0.39) 
Hostile merger 0.0055 -0.0240 -0.0034 -0.0021 -0.0123 0.0078 
 (0.28) (-1.33) (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.75) (0.27) 
Neutral merger 0.0091 -0.0210*** -0.0041 0.0019 -0.0287** 0.0069 
 (0.53) (-4.49) (-0.19) (0.11) (-2.26) (0.33) 
Public (cash) 0.0099 0.0107 0.0123 0.0015 0.0274 0.0149 
 (1.15) (0.45) (1.13) (0.14) (1.01) (1.19) 
Public (stock) -0.0776*** -0.1024*** -0.0837*** -0.0692*** -0.1158*** -0.0743*** 
 (-5.70) (-3.58) (-5.11) (-4.04) (-3.48) (-3.69) 
Private (cash) 0.0043 0.0254 0.0014 -0.0031 0.0105 0.0048 
 (0.44) (0.94) (0.13) (-0.24) (0.33) (0.31) 
Private (stock) 0.0548*** 0.0178 0.0585*** 0.0548*** 0.0007 0.0663*** 
 (3.37) (0.62) (3.12) (2.63) (0.02) (2.76) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0327*** -0.0301 0.0229* 0.0087 -0.0648* 0.0017 
 (3.03) (-0.95) (1.78) (0.71) (-1.68) (0.11) 
Free cash flow 0.0430 0.4640*** 0.2062 0.2275 0.3628** 0.2746 
 (0.21) (3.13) (1.09) (1.32) (2.55) (1.37) 
Tobin’s q -0.0913*** -0.0424 -0.0813*** -0.0733* -0.0496 -0.0787* 
 (-3.73) (-1.01) (-3.07) (-1.72) (-0.70) (-1.68) 
Leverage 0.0273* 0.0094 0.0091 -0.0188 -0.1026 -0.0621 
 (1.83) (0.34) (0.56) (-0.62) (-1.35) (-1.61) 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,106 1,319 5,487 6,922 1,273 5,317 
R-squared 0.093 0.086 0.074 0.347 0.294 0.346 
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.074 0.071 0.125 0.101 0.110 
 
